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
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## LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

**VOLUME 1**

**Professor Michael Trebilcock  
Professor Mariana Mota Prado**

**Winter 2011**



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**LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT**  
**Winter 2011**

**Professor Michael Trebilcock**  
**Professor Mariana Mota Prado**

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